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Abstract
Many jurisdictions use net metering to record the power exchange between solar photo-
voltaic panels and the grid, thus valuing home production at the electricity retail rate. How-
ever, if over the billing period, production exceeds consumption, the surplus remains freely
available for consumption. In Wallonia (Belgium), this system was combined with generous
subsidies for solar panels that encouraged households to set-up large installations, possibly ex-
ceeding their consumption needs. In this context, we test for a possible rebound effect. Based
on a large sample of residential PV installations, we observe that a large proportion of house-
holds oversized their installation to benefit from the subsidies and, later ended-up consuming
most of their excess production. The effect is econometrically highly significant. There are
thus evidence of a strong increase in energy consumption by residential PV owners, that runs
counter the original policy design.
Keywords: Rebound effect; Solar PV; Net metering
JEL Codes: C51, Q48, Q58, Q410, Q420
*The authors would like to thank O. De Groote, J. Jacqmin, M. Lefebvre, B. Lejeune, I. Salem, F. Verboven and semi-
nar participants at the EARIE and at the University of Liege for comments and suggestions.
†Departament d’Economia, Universitat de Girona, Spain. E-mail: nicolas.boccard@udg.edu
‡University of Liege, HEC Liege, LCII, Belgium; CORE (UCLouvain) and CESifo. E-mail: agautier@uliege.be
1
1 Introduction
With net metering system installed in a house, the exchange of power between a decentralized
production unit such as a rooftop photovoltaic panel and the distribution grid is recorded by a
single meter that runs backward when energy is supplied to the grid.1 Over the billing period, this
meter only records the net energy imports, the difference between total local consumption and
total local production. This energy amount is the sole basis for establishing the consumer’s bill.
Usually, if there is production in excess of consumption over the billing period i.e. net exports
to the grid, there is no additional compensation and the volumetric part of the bill is set to zero.
Consumers have thus no incentives to produce more than what they consume but, if they do, they
can consume their excess production for free which ought to be a powerful incentive. Indeed, Qiu
et al. (2019) document how PV owners in Arizona increase their daily consumption when their
daily solar production increases.
Net metering thus values the electricity produced by the PV modules at the retail price which
includes grid fees and taxes; this generous pricing is one of the support mechanism used to pro-
mote the deployment of distributed generation. However, as shown by Matisoff and Johnson
(2017) for the US, net metering alone proved ineffective and needed to be augmented by other
instruments to support the investment in solar panels by residential customers. For this reason,
government support for solar photovoltaic panels commonly uses a combination of instruments
such as subsidies for production and/or investment.2 The intensity of support to solar PV varies
considerably across countries, and this in turn impacts the deployment of solar PV installations.
In this paper, we study the unintended consequences of the solar supporting scheme deployed
in Wallonia (southern Belgium) between 2008 and 2014. It featured 3 components: (i) net meter-
ing, (ii) volumetric tariff over a long billing period (one year) and (iii) production subsidies through
a tradable green certificate (TGC) mechanism. We estimate the latter to be generous enough to
cover by itself the module installation costs in just a few years. Overall, this scheme encouraged
many households to invest in large size installations, eventually larger than their consumption
needs (year over year). However in Wallonia, as in most of the jurisdictions using net metering,
should the yearly production exceeds the yearly consumption (i.e., a negative index on the meter),
no additional payment for these net exports will be forthcoming. In other words, excessive yearly
production is supplied freely to the grid. As already explained, this provides households with “free”
electricity once that point has been reached.
These peculiarities make Wallonia a good place to test for a possible rebound effect, which
1Smart meters record separately inflow and outflow of electricity thus allowing the setting of distinct prices. Brown
and Sappington (2017) and Gautier et al. (2018) discuss the optimality of net metering i.e. a single price for the two
flows.
2For a comparison of the different mechanism in place in the EU and the associated return, see Campoccia et al.
(2009), Dusonchet and Telaretti (2010, 2015).
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refers to "an increase in the energy usage after the introduction of a more efficient (energy-saving)
technology".3 This rebound effect is well-documented in the field of energy and we focus here on a
possible direct rebound, namely a consumption increase following the introduction of a new tech-
nology. It may arise as a substitution effect when the new technology changes the relative prices
of energy and but also as an income effect if the new technology saves money on the energy bill.
Informal discussions in Wallonia with (household) adopters, PV installers and managers at the Dis-
tribution System Operator (DSO) lead us to believe that the Walloon supporting scheme pushed
households to increase their electricity consumption after installing solar panels. Some house-
holds even appear to have intentionally oversized their PV installation in order to benefit from the
generous supporting scheme and later installed new electrical appliances (e.g., heat pump, auxil-
iary electrical heating system, air-conditioner, spa, etc.) to consume their freely available excessive
energy production.
To prove this conjecture, we develop the following reasoning. Firstly, we show that the gen-
erous support offered by the Walloon TGC implied a positive return on investment for solar PV
installations, even in the absence of net metering. In other words, a PV installation generates a
net income thanks to the TCG. For this reason, revenue-maximizing households have an incen-
tive to deploy the largest possible PV installation. However, three different set of constraints limit
that choice: firstly, rooftop considerations such as size, orientation or inclination, secondly regu-
lation as the support scheme is available for installations of less than 10 kWp and lastly financial
constraints that may limit the household’s ability to invest.4 The next step of our reasoning is to
observe that owners of an installation producing more than what they consume (over a year) are
supplying for free their excess production to the grid. Interestingly, this is not so on an instanta-
neous basis but holds true on a yearly basis, as with net metering the grid is acting as a giant storage
facility. Indeed, whenever a household has an excessive production (e.g., at noon in summer) with
respect to its instantaneous consumption, she stores it on the grid and, crucially, it remains freely
available for later use (e.g., winter evening). It is only at year’s end when billing is established that
if total yearly production exceeds total yearly consumption, the surplus is lost beyond recall to the
DSO.
We venture that two channels may lead to higher electricity consumption for PV owners. Since
the solar investment has a positive net present value, owners of (subsidized) PV modules receive
an extra income, and, as long as the income elasticity of electricity is positive, it induces some
extra consumption. Additionally, households with an oversized installation, generate a production
surplus that is freely available for consumption. A rational household will compare this zero-price
electricity with other costly energy vectors and should, in all likelihood, substitute some of the
3Jevons (1865) gave a first version for coal consumption. The issue reemerges with Khazzoom (1980)’s similar find-
ing for the case of energy efficiency in home appliances.
4Financial constraints might be the less severe as the market developed solutions to overcome them: loans for PV
installations and third-party investments paid back with the trade of the green certificates.
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latter by the former, ultimately increasing their electricity consumption. We have thus identified
a potential income effect and a zero-price or a substitution effect leading to a higher electricity
consumption after the installation of PV modules.
To test for this two-pronged rebound effect, we collect consumption data from households
equipped with solar PV, the so-called prosumers. More precisely, we record the yearly meter read-
ing from 2010 to 2016 of all the households owning a PV installation in the jurisdiction of the domi-
nant DSO of Wallonia, totaling well over 90000 clients. In addition to the meter records, we collect
the size and date of installation of the PV system. We then construct for each installation three
variables: the yearly average consumption before and after the PV installation (kWh per day) as
well as the PV installation size. As the meter runs backwards, we do not observe directly the con-
sumption of a prosumer but rather its net electricity import (consumption minus production). To
estimate the true consumption, we add to the net import recorded by the meter, the estimated
production of the PV modules using detailed weather information and monitoring data from the
Transmission System Operator.
Next, we compare the consumption of prosumers before and after the installation of the solar
panels (±2 years).5 We define an installation as oversized if the capacity of the modules is larger
than the recent past consumption; otherwise, it is undersized. After discarding erroneous meter
readings, our useable database contains about 35000 undersized installations and 30000 oversized
ones. It is expected that prosumers have a higher consumption after the PV installation and that
this effect should be stronger for consumers who have oversized their installation. Taking the
ratio of consumption after/before, the consumption falls 3% for consumers with an undersized
installation and rises by 35% for those with an oversized installation.
Since this oversized group is exposed to both an income effect and a zero-marginal price effect,
we take these stylized facts as indicative of a significant rebound effect, especially for oversized in-
stallations. Our econometric analysis will confirm this initial evidence against the previously held
idea in the literature that PV generation exceeding total consumption at the monthly level was
a rare occurrence. Taking into account several control variables, including the variations in re-
tail electricity prices across areas and in temperatures, we estimate that most of this free electric-
ity available for prosumers who oversized their installation ends-up being consumed onsite. The
sheer scale of this rebound effect is obviously a direct consequence of the particular institutional
context that offered both positive net income with the TGC, thus encouraging large installations,
and free electricity storage on the grid (aka the giant battery) through net metering.
Two methods have been developed to test for the rebound effect (see Sorrell et al. (2009) for
a review). The first, which we follow, is the so-called quasi-experimental approach; it consists in
5De Groote et al. (2016) and Oberst et al. (2019) show that households installing photovoltaic systems have different
characteristics than non adopters. Hence, estimations of the rebound effect based on the comparison of two groups,
prosumers and non-prosumers should take these differences into account to avoid selection bias. Our methodology
does not suffer from the risk of a selection bias as we compare the same consumers before and after the PV installation.
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comparing the demand for energy before and after an energy improvement. The main challenge
is to control for confounding factors that could explain the change in energy demand without
being linked to the change we focus on. For this reason, our econometric analysis controls for
changes in temperatures and prices. The use of a control group does not seem to be appropriate
because prosumers and non-prosumers have different characteristics; prosumers typically own a
house and belong to the upper income brackets in order to be able to foot the initial solar panel
investment (cf. footnote 5). Finally, our large sample (over 65 000 households) drastically limits
the risk of measurement errors. The second approach to measuring the rebound effect consists in
performing an econometric analysis to estimate the elasticities of the energy demand, either the
price elasticity or the elasticity with respect to energy efficiency.
Greening et al. (2000) provides a detailed survey of the early literature estimating a direct re-
bound effect. Most studies focus on fuel consumption, residential heating & cooling and energy
appliances. Of the few papers dealing with a solar rebound effect, the evidences is mixed. This
may indicate that the consumer’s behavior is context specific and depends on the institutional
framework in place. For the UK, Keirstead (2007) reports, based on survey data, a self-assessed
overall saving of 5.6% in energy consumption. For Germany, Oberst et al. (2019) compare the
consumption behavior of a small sample of German prosumers with a matched sample of non-
prosumers. They test the impact of being a prosumer on the heating expenses but fail to identify
a prosumer effect. Accordingly, it means that being a prosumer does not change the household’s
behavior compared to a similar non-prosumer household. Wittenberg and Matthies (2016) use
a questionnaire to compare the energy consumption behavior of prosumers and non-prosumers
in Germany. They do not find significant differences in the level of consumption but they report
evidence of a high prevalence of demand-shifting activities for prosumers, a behavior that is en-
couraged by the net billing system in place in Germany. For Australia, Deng and Newton (2017) use
billing data of a representative sample of consumers and prosumers in Sidney. They use individ-
ual data over the period 2007-2014. According to their estimation, the production of solar energy
generates an extra electricity consumption by the prosumers of about 20%. Interestingly, the mag-
nitude of the rebound effect depends on the feed-in-tariff in place and is larger for early adopters
benefiting from the most generous feed-in-tariff. Lastly, Qiu et al. (2019) identify an important
rebound effect associated with PV adoption in Arizona, finding that generating 1 kWh triggers
an additional consumption of 0.18 kWh by prosumers. Thanks to daily records, they are able to
show that consumption increases almost simultaneously with production. Under net-metering,
the marginal price of electricity, be it (local) solar or (grid) conventional, is always equal to the
retail price. Hence, there is no change in the marginal price of energy after a PV installation and,
a priori, no reason to increase consumption. However, as solar households manage to decrease
their energy bill, their average electricity price is lower. According to Ito (2014), the main driver of
energy consumption is not the marginal price but the average price. Hence, a solar rebound can
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result from a decrease in the average price of electricity post-PV adoption.
At the outset, we aim to highlight two original elements in our approach. Firstly, we work with
a near exhaustive sample of 65000 households. This large dataset allows us to have a very broad
picture of the consumption patterns of households in Wallonia and, in particular, to compare their
consumption before and after the installation of PV modules in a consistent way. Secondly, the
institutional context in Wallonia was highly specific with a combination of net metering and, a
generous TGC creating the conditions for investing into an oversized installation.6
A key consequence of our findings is that because household consumption and production
are almost never simultaneous, our identified solar rebound effect might have a substantial and
negative carbon impact. Observe indeed that solar production peaks in summer while household
consumption peaks during winter. On the one hand, the thousands of Walloon prosumers under
consideration add further demand to the peak winter electricity load which is served by coal, natu-
ral gas and oil power stations whose carbon emissions are very large. On the other hand, the same
group exports green electricity to the grid during the central hours of the summer, thus displacing
nuclear power (from any western European country due to the highly meshed network centered
on Belgium) whose carbon emissions are nil. Future policy design should therefore be careful to
prevent such an undesirable inter temporal swapping.
The paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, we present the main features of the PV sector
in Wallonia and we estimate the net present value of a PV installation. In Section 3, we describe
our data and our empirical methodology. Our main results are presented and discussed in Section
4. We further illustrate the rebound effect by performing panel econometrics in Section 5. Finally,
section 6 concludes. In Appendix 6, we develop a theoretical model to discuss the income effect
and the zero-marginal price effect associated with solar panels.
2 Photovoltaic development inWallonia
2.1 Public support to rooftop PV
In Belgium, the promotion of renewable energies is delegated to the regional governments of Wal-
lonia, Flanders and Brussels. Regarding residential solar PV installations, the Walloon government
has implemented the specific policies Solwatt from 2008 to March 2014 and Qualiwatt from March
2014 to June 2018. Small-scale residential installations with a power rating below 10 kWp were el-
igible to these support mechanisms. In addition, Wallonia used a net metering system to record
exchanges between the grid and the PV installation.
The Solwatt scheme is particularly apt for a rebound study because it has been active for a long
period. We are thus able to select many households whose electricity bills cover both the before
6In Flanders, the generous support combining tax cuts and TGC covered the upfront investment cost from 2009 to
2012 (De Groote and Verboven (2019)), creating the conditions for a similar rebound effect.
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and after PV installation. Such a strategy is impossible for the ensuing Qualiwatt scheme. As a sup-
port scheme for small scale PV installations, Solwatt relies on a tradable green certificates (TGC)
mechanism: each MWh of electricity produced from a renewable source is entitled a number of
green certificates. A market for TGCs was created with, on the supply side, producers of green en-
ergy and on the buyer side, energy retailers. The latter must comply with a renewables portfolio
standard (RPS) whereby a given percentage of their electricity must be certified from renewable
sources. In this market, there is a price floor of 65e allowing producers to sell their certificates at
this minimum price to the Transmission System Operator ELIA (TSO) and a price ceiling of 100e
which equates the administrative fine for missing certificates.
Before 2008, the granting rate was 1 TGC per MWh for solar and wind technologies and the
granting period was set to 10 years. The Solwatt mechanism changed both the granting rate, from
1 TGC per MWh to 7, and the granting period, from 10 to 15 years for the residential PV installations
of less than 10 kWp. The attribution period and rate were subsequently adjusted as shown in Table
1. The Solwatt mechanism ended in 2014, replaced by Qualiwatt whereby new PV installations
were no longer eligible for TGC but received a fixed premium per installed kWp to guarantee the
return on investment. Installations made during the Solwatt period continue to receive TGCs, as
specified in Table 1, after the fading out of the mechanism in 2014.
Program Application Grant rate Grant period
period (TGC/MWh) (years)
Solwatt 1 Jan. 2008 - Nov. 2011 7 15 years
Solwatt 2 Dec. 2011- Mar. 2012 7 10 years
Solwatt 3 Apr. 2012 - Aug. 2012 6 10 years
Solwatt 4 Sep. 2012 - Mar. 2013 5 10 years
Solwatt 5 Apr. 2013 - Feb. 2014 1,5 10 years
Table 1: Grant rate and grant period of TGC, Solwatt mechanisms
The last crucial characteristic of the Solwatt scheme is to allow net metering for installations
below the 10 kWp threshold. Eligible consumers thus see their energy bill being based on their
net recorded consumption qˆ = q −k, the difference between electricity consumption q and pro-
duction k. It is however of the utmost importance to note that in Wallonia, whenever total PV
production exceeds total consumption over the billing period (k > q or qˆ < 0), no payment ac-
crues to the consumer; the registered consumption used for the bill is simply set to zero. This
setting is particularly advantageous for Walloon clients as electricity tariffs are almost exclusively
volumetric (i.e. based on the registered consumption), with no capacity charge and very small
fixed charges (covering the renting of the meter). Hence, when qˆ < 0, the consumer’s bill is almost
zero. This also implies that, whenever qˆ < 0, the excess production is supplied freely to the grid.
Therefore, this excessive production can be consumed by the households at no cost.
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2.2 PV deployment inWallonia
After 2008, the number of PV installations in Wallonia increased dramatically as shown on Figure
1. Starting from virtually zero installations in 2007, there were 133000 small-scale PV installations
at the end of 2016, with an installed total capacity of 764 MWp. This success story had two un-
intended consequences. First, the supporting scheme quickly rose to represent a huge cost for
the collectivity. For the period 2003-2012, Boccard and Gautier (2015) estimate an overall average
support of 588 e per MWh of solar electricity paid by the TGC mechanism. Second, there was an
excessive supply of green certificates and disequilibrium on the market. As a consequence, the
TGC price fell close to the price floor of 65 e as shown on Figure 2. These developments lead
the government to end of the Solwatt program in 2014 and replace it by the less generous Quali-
watt alternative. After the end of Solwatt, the number of new installations was considerably re-
duced, with 4200 and 6000 new PV installations in 2015 and 2016 respectively, far from the 48000
new installations registered in 2012.
Figure 1: PV installations in Wallonia, 2008-2016
2.3 Net present value of a PV installation
In this section, we estimate the net present value (NPV) of a photovoltaic installation in Wallonia
when supported by the Solwatt program.
2.3.1 Capacity Factor β
We first need a precise estimation of the solar panels electricity production for a typical Walloon
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Figure 2: Price of green certificate, 2007-2016
and most reliable is the real-time monitoring of all Belgian PV generation by the Transmission Sys-
tem Operator ELIA since November 2012. We use the data corresponding to the Liège region to
compute the instantaneous capacity factor as the ratio of PV generation to monitored PV capacity
(measured in MWp). This ratio is the percentage of time where, on average, a PV panel fitted in
the Liège region is producing at full capacity. We use the daily average time series. This single time
series is adequate inso far as the photovoltaic power potential is sufficiently uniform across the
Walloon region. The irradiation map displayed on the left panel of Figure 3 shows a large variation
across north and south of Europe with Wallonia at the southern tip of Belgium, squeezed between
France and Germany, being in the low range. The close up shown on the right panel reveals irradi-
ation homogeneity within Wallonia, with is a maximum 10% difference between extremes.
Figure 3: Photovoltaic power potential in Europe & Belgium
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Prior to 2012, we use the “daily sunny time” series published by the Royal Meteorological In-
stitute (RMI) for the Liège Airport station. As there is a strong 82% correlation between the ELIA
and RMI series over the period of common recording, we use the fitted values to extrapolate the
capacity factor prior to 2012. The complete capacity factor series is shown on Figure 4. Finally, we
compute a monthly capacity factor (CF) by taking the average of daily values. From 2007 to 2017
(both included), the long term average CF is 10.8%, meaning that a PV panel of 1 kWp capacity
produces in average 0.108×24 ≈ 2.6 kWh per day or 945 kWh per year. Based on the average res-
idential electricity consumption of 7.4 MWh in Belgium over the study period (cf. Eurostat), each
person may support her needs with 8 solar rooftop panels. The average capacity factors for each
year are reported in Table 2.
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean
CF 10.5 10.8 11.5 10.9 12.1 11. 7.5 10.9 11.7 10.9 10.9 10.8
Table 2: Estimated Capacity Factor in Wallonia






Daily Capacity Factor smoothed over 2 months
Figure 4: Daily capacity factor βm , fitted values
One may object that the actual production of a PV installation could differ from the estima-
tion for three reasons: (#1) defectiveness or wear-and-tear of the installation, (#2) orientation and
inclinations of the panels and (#3) local weather conditions. We claim that none of these issue
threatens the validity of our study. Firstly, as we mainly record consumption for no more than two
years after the PV installation, panels are still new and well functioning. Furthermore, the panels
benefit from a two year compulsory guarantee from the installer. Second, differences between a
south and a south-east orientation will change the production by at most 5% (for a 35◦ roof inclina-
tion). Lastly, solar irradiation may be taken to be homogeneous over such a small geographic area,
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Wallonia being approximatively a flat rectangle of 160 km by 100 km. Our capacity factor estimate
thus corresponds to the average orientation and inclination and we cannot correct for these rela-
tively small differences. The calculation of the PV production and of the household consumption
will certainly suffer from small measurement errors but there are no systematic biases.
2.3.2 Net present values
An installation benefiting from the Solwatt mechanism will be granted TGCs for a given period and
we estimate the net present value of this TGC allocation. For that, we first compute the production
of an installation using the estimated capacity factor β and applying a loss of power of 0.5% per
year. From that, we compute the corresponding TGC endowment and we estimate its value. We
provide three estimations based on three different TGC prices: the low one is based on a constant
TGC price equal to the price floor of 65 e, the medium one is based on the true market price for
the TGC up to 2016 and on the price floor for 2017 onwards; lastly, the high estimate is based on
a constant price equal to the TGC price at the installation date. To compute the NPV, we use an
interest rate of 3%.7 We compare the NPV of the TGC endowment with the system PV module
price computed by the IEA for Belgium (IEA, 2015).8 The NPV and cost shown in Table 3 are both
expressed ine per Wp.
Year Program NPV TGC (e/Wp) Cost (e/Wp)
low med high
2008 Solwatt 1 4.88 5.85 6.98 5.8
2009 Solwatt 1 4.88 5.46 6.93 5.2
2010 Solwatt 1 4.88 5.34 6.70 4.2
2011 Solwatt 1 4.88 5.22 6.47 3.4
2012 Solwatt 3 3.02 3.23 3.73 2.7
2013 Solwatt 5 0.75 0.79 0.97 2.3
Table 3: Net present value of green certificates
We observe that from 2008 to 2012, the support provided by the TGC mechanism clearly ex-
ceeds the installation cost which implies that solar PV installations were a source of net income
for the household. For the year 2013, the support of the TGC is in itself insufficient to make the in-
stallation profitable. However, households also benefit from the meter running backwards. Taking
7De Groote and Verboven (2019) estimate that households in Flanders, where a similar TGC was in place have a
discount factor of 15% and that they considerably underestimate the benefits of the TGC mechanism. As a conse-
quence, the adoption rate was lower despite a huge support. The problem we consider here is different as we focus on
technology adopters only. The fact that some non-adopters were refrained to invest because of a high discount rate is
not really a concern for our analysis.
8Until 2011, households were eligible for tax credits if they invested in solar PV. This credit, which varied from a
maximum of 1200e in 2006 to 3600e in 2011, is not included in the reported PV module price.
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a retail price in the range of [0.15-0.25] e/kWh, the NPV of the net metering, based on the same
parameters as above, is in the range of [1.98-3.31] e/Wp. Once this additional revenue is taken
into account, the investment in solar PV is again profitable under all the different versions of the
Solwatt program.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data Source and Description
The 262 municipalities of Wallonia are serviced by 7 distinct DSOs. The largest one ORES, cover-
ing 191 municipalities, derives from the merger of seven smaller DSOs and maintains the distinct
tariffs of the pre-merger zones which involve substantial differences. The areas of Wallonia where
ORES distribute electricity are shown on Figure 5.
Figure 5: Areas of Wallonia covered by ORES
In our sample, the unit of observation is the European Article Number (EAN) which uniquely
identifies a point of consumption, typically a household. We limit ourselves to residential EANs,
thus excluding commercial and industrial clients. For each anonymized EAN in the ORES distribu-
tion zone, we collect location (zip code), the yearly meter readings (meter index and reading date)
from 2010 to 2017, the PV installation date and the effective power of the PV modules (kWp).9 Our
dataset contains close to 100000 EANs. The meters used are mostly mechanical (able to return
to zero) and read about once a year, making it impossible to obtain a more granular information.
Meter reading, used for billing, is performed either by a representative of the DSO or by the client
and transmitted by mail, phone or online to the DSO. Clearly, some readings are erroneous, forcing
us to apply an error detection algorithm.
9The effective power is the minimum of the inverter power and the panel power in case they differ.
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There are different types of meters in use: the single meter (most common), the day/night me-
ters and the exclusive night meter. With a single meter, there is a unique meter to record all con-
sumption. With the day and night meters, there are two adjacent meters to record the consump-
tion during the peak period (7am-10pm on weekdays) and the consumption during the off-peak
period (outside peak) with different rates for the two periods. Net metering applies to both dual
meters.10 An exclusive night meter is used for the consumption during the night period exclusively
and it is not frequently used. Infrequently, an EAN may be equipped with several meters.
3.2 Consumption Estimation
For each selected EAN, we estimate the daily electricity consumption for the entire period where
we have meter readings. By definition, the total consumption over a billing period is the differ-
ence between the indices read on the meter.11 For households equipped with a day/night meter,
we sum the consumption recorded on the two meters. For households equipped with several me-
ters, we aggregate the various consumptions. We eliminate all EANs with missing, incomplete or
incoherent data resulting for example from an (unobserved) replacement of the meter.
Over a billing period going from t1 to t2, the EAN is billed for the B kWh read on his meter.
Whenever the PV installation date τ is prior to t2, we know that local electricity production k starts
offsetting household consumption so that the meter only records net imports q −k. Typically, a
household imports electricity during the night and exports around noon. Likewise, imports are
larger during the winter and exports larger during the summer. To recover the true household
consumption q , we estimate the daily solar PV production k and sum it over all the billing period;
total PV output over the period is thus D = k˜∑t2t=τβt where k˜ is the household’s PV size and βt is
the previously estimated daily PV capacity factor. The total consumption over the period is then
Q =B+D . Recall that net metering makes the consumption decision at every moment completely
independent of how much is being produced on the house roof at that same moment since the
distribution network acts as a giant battery.
Next, to account for the seasonality of daily load, we draw on the synthetic load profile (SLP)
computed by Synergrid, the professional association of electricity and gas network managers in
Belgium. The SLP for each day is the consumption of a representative household taking into
account many elements such as the calendar day, climatic factors, sunrise and sunshine hours,
day-off, public or school holidays, etc... DSOs use these curves to estimate the clients’ yearly con-
sumption based on their meter recordings. Practically, we use the SLP curve st for the Liège region
10If a household is equipped with two meters and its PV production exceeds peak consumption, it can switch to a
single meter without having to change the meter since the indexes of the two meters can be aggregated by the DSO
before establishing the bill.
11We control for meter moving back to zero after a complete revolution since they have either 5 or 6 digits.
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where ν = 1t2−t1
∑t2
t=t1 st is the average SLP value over the relevant period. The (re)construction
procedure is illustrated in Figure 6 with one randomly chosen (true) household.






Metered Load with PV output seasonality corrected
Figure 6: Reconstructed Household Load Curve including PV output
The red curve displays the average daily load as measured by the meter difference between
two readings ( Bt2−t1 ); in this particular case, it becomes almost nil once the PV system is installed.
The blue curve is the red one to which we add the average daily PV output ( Dt2−t1 ) for each billing
period (given the panel size), from the installation date on. Lastly, the green curve distorts the blue
one with the SLP to account for the load variation across seasons. The household is thus storing
energy on the network during the summer and conversely drawing from the network during the
winter (on average the blue and green curves are at the same level over any billing period). Using
this reconstruction procedure, we obtain for each billing period and each household an average
daily consumption.
4 Estimating the Solar Rebound Effect
4.1 Income and zero-marginal price effects
Our econometric test of a solar rebound effect builds on a formal model of household behav-
ior developed in the appendix. In this model, households optimize their PV investment, their
consumption of energy and a composite good. We identify two channels for a rebound effect. The
first is an income effect as the TGC provides an additional net income to PV owners. As long as
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energy is a normal good, we should observe an increase in electricity consumption for PV own-
ers. The second channel comes from a zero-price effect. Indeed, the generous support offered by
the Solwatt program motivates households to oversize their installation beyond their need (on a
yearly consumption basis), since the cost of the PV was covered by the TGC. Once, a household
possesses a PV module producing more than what it consumes, the excess production is available
to consumption for free. Households with an oversized installation are thus exposed to zero price
electricity. We expect these households to consume some of this free electricity. Our objective is
to test this conjecture.
4.2 Statistical Analysis
To estimate a possible rebound effect, we use a quasi experimental approach and compare the
household’s estimated consumption before and after the PV installation. The comparison is made
over a large and exhaustive sample of prosumers which limits the risk of measurement errors. We
select the EANs for which the PV installations was done during the Solwatt period. The program
officially ended on the 02/01/2014 but all installations ordered before this date remained entitled,
even if the connection date was posterior. Accounting for the delay between the ordering of solar
panels and the connection date, we select all the installations with a connection date ranging from
January 2008 to April 2014. At any rate, there were few installations in 2014 (see Figure 1) as the end
of the program was largely anticipated. For each EAN, we estimate the consumption over 2 years





t=τ qt . Our sample contains over 65 000 observations for which we were able to estimate
both q and q .
To disentangle the income and the zero-marginal price effects, we split our sample in two
groups. We construct a group of undersized installations in which the installation capacity is in-
sufficient to cover the past consumptions (for t < τ, qt ≤ kt ) and a group of oversized installations
that have a larger capacity than their past consumption (for t < τ, qt > kt ). The first group should
be subject to the income effect only while the second group is expected to display both the income
and the zero marginal price effects. In our sample, we identify about 35 000 households in the un-
dersized group and about 30 000 households in the oversized group. The following table presents
the descriptive statistics of our sample looking at the two quartiles and the median.
As shown in Table 4, the average consumption slightly increase after the installation of rooftop
PV panels but the evolution differs radically between the two groups. In the undersized group,
the average consumption decreases slightly (-4%) while for the oversized group it increased dra-
matically (+35%). We further illustrate this statistic with Figure 7, we plot the daily consumption
before and after for each individual observation i.e. the ratio q/q . If an observation lies above (be-
low) the 45° line, the consumption increases (decreases) after the PV installation. In the oversized
15
Quantile 25% 25% 50% 50% 75% 75%
PV installation Before After Before After Before After
Full Sample 9.0 10.4 13.0 14.3 18.8 20.7
Undersized 14.0 13. 18.4 17.8 27.1 26.7
Oversized 6.9 9.0 9.7 12.0 12.5 16.5
Table 4: Daily consumption (kWh)
group, three quarters (74%) of the observations lie above the diagonal while they are more equally
dispersed for the undersized group with 40% of the installations above the diagonal. These statis-
tics suggest a very substantial rebound effect for households that have oversized their installation.
More precisely, they suggest an important zero-price effect and a limited (or even inexistant) in-
come effect.
Figure 7: Consumption before and after PV installation
To further illustrate the change of behavior after solar panels have been installed, we write
q
q = kq ×
q
k where the first ratio
k
q measures the free electricity available to the household should its
consumption remain constant; this ratio being greater than 1 in the oversized group. The second
ratio qk measures the percentage of the electricity produced that is actually consumed. If for in-
stance, kq = 1.3, the household produces 30% more than it (really) needs and if
q
k = 0.9, it consumes
90% of its production. These figures imply that, for this household, qq = 1.17 i.e. consumption in-
creases by 17% after the PV installation.
On Figure 8, we sort our sample of 65000 households along variable kq and group observations
into 50 bins, each representing 2% of the sample. We then compute the mean of the two ratios in
each bin to produce the plot. Absent any rebound effect, we should have a curve given by the in-
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verse function as, for a constant consumption (q = q), the ratio qk is the inverse of kq . On the figure,
oversized households appear to the right of 100 (by construction) and very interestingly, the curve
becomes flat at about 85% which means that a large swath of households went for oversized panels
and consumed most of their PV output, solely putting back 15% of the potential green electricity
onto the Belgian grid.
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Figure 8: Consumption before/after, oversized group
4.3 Econometric Estimation
Our objective with the econometric model is to explain the difference between consumption be-
fore and after the installation of PV panels. For that task, we use as a depended variable, the differ-
ence between the daily consumption after and before date τ (both taken over two years):
∆q = qt |t>τ−qt |t<τ
We explain the variations in consumption by two categories of variables linked to the instal-
lation characteristics and to the environment. We have two environmental variables. The first
measures the difference in the average temperature before and after τ as temperature is an impor-
tant driver of electricity consumption. For that, we construct the monthly average temperature ζt
by taking observations from the three airports of Maastricht (Netherlands), Florennes and Beau-
vechain (both in Wallonia) using daily maximum and minimum temperature. The independent
variable we construct is the difference between averages before and after PV installation
∆ζ= ζt |t>τ−ζt |t<τ
The second environmental variable is linked to the price of electricity. There are many elec-
tricity retailers in Wallonia offering a large variety of products. To our knowledge, there are no
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differences in the commercial offers within Wallonia and all the households can pick a contract
within the same choice set. There are however differences in the grid tariff charged by the DSO.
Grid tariffs are almost exclusively variable i.e. a price per kWh. We then compute for each ORES
tariff a variable that measures the average grid tariff after τ and we expect that a larger price nega-
tively influences consumption, especially for households with an undersized installation.
The independent variable k˜ for capacity is the PV installation size in kWp; a positive sign for
this variable indicates an income effect since an additional PV panel generates an extra income for
the household (cf. Table 3). The last and crucial independent variable measures the available free
electricity (if any) for the household. We construct first a dummy variable indicating the existence
of an oversized installation (k > q); the dummy is equal to 1 if the estimated average daily solar
powered production is larger than the average past daily consumption of the house. Then, we
interact this dummy with the excess solar output k − q . The “oversized” variable θ = (k − q)|k>q
measures the available free electricity. We estimate the following equation:
∆q =α+β1∆ζ+β2p+β3k˜+β4θ+²
We exclude the top and bottom 1% entries with exceptionally large negative or positive con-
sumption since these most likely originate with errors at the meter reading stage. We thus run the
equation over a set of 65638 observations with a R2 of 23%. Results are reported in Table 5.
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-Statistic P-Value
α 0.977 0.17 5.737 10−9
Tariff -0.136 0.018 -7.391 10−13
k˜ -0.026 0.005 -5.198 10−7
θ 0.869 0.007 130.74 10−330
∆ζ 1.111 0.067 16.483 10−61
Table 5: Estimation Results
According to our estimations, all the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The constant
is positive, meaning that in average daily consumption increases by 1.35 kWh a day. This increase
in consumption is slightly mitigated by the size of the PV installations as the coefficient of k˜ is
negative. Owners of larger PV installations have a lower increase in their consumption but the
magnitude of the coefficient is limited. There is no clear evidence of a significant income effect in
our data. Variations in consumption are also lower when consumers face a higher grid tariff and
this evidence is consistent with our model.
Turning to the analysis of the oversize variable θ, the coefficient found is quite large. Our es-
timation shows that an additional daily production of 1 kWh of free electricity is consumed by the
producing household at an 87% rate. Only a small fraction (13%) is supplied to the network. We
have therefore characterized an extremely substantial rebound effect for households who have
oversized their installation. This behavior is driven by the zero-marginal price effect.
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5 Panel Estimation
In the previous section, we compared the consumption of a prosumer before and after the PV in-
stallation over a time frame of 24 months; we identified a strong zero-price effect whereby house-
holds oversize their installation to benefit from the generous subsidies and then consume most of
their production, leading to a substantial increase in consumption. Causality might, however, be
reversed with households oversizing their installations in order to consume more, for instance to
buy an electric vehicle (EV), instal air conditioning or a heat pump (both hypothesis being illus-
trative of a rebound effect). In this section, we investigate this question further by way of a panel
estimation to identify specific trends in consumptions for some group of prosumers.
Our quasi exhaustive sample contains the yearly meter reading of about 90 000 households
over 7 years. As previously explained, we reconstruct their average consumption per billing pe-
riod. We may thus use a panel estimation to explain their consumption while taking into account
unobserved individual differences (heterogeneity). To allow a precise estimation of explanatory
variables, the billing date is recorded as a month so that our panel becomes strongly unbalanced.
The panel model is
qi t =α+βᵀxi t +²i t (2)
The dependent variable qi t is the electricity consumption of household i at date t , expressed
in kWh per month. The vector of observed variables xi t contains information about the PV instal-
lation, the subsidy program, and at the municipal level income, population density and electric-
ity tariff. In particular, we use the following variables. A time trend (month) capturing the long
term evolution of consumption; variable pvsize measuring the capacity of the PV installation is
scaled in kWh/month instead of kWp for comparability with qi t , variable subsidy distinguishes
between the various stages of the support programs. For installations undertaken during the Sol-
watt period, the variable subsidy is equal to the number of TGC granted (see Table 1). For those
undertaken during the Qualiwatt period, the variable subsidy is equal to zero. We expect a signif-
icant income effect to yield positive coefficients for both pvsize and subsidy. Variable oversize is
a dummy variable equal to one if the installation is oversized. We interact this dummy variable
with the time trend to capture a specific time trend for prosumers with an oversized installation:
free_elec = month×oversized. We expect a positive coefficient for this free electricity variable
since owners of an oversized installation should increase consumption over time as they realize
they have freely available electricity. Variable tariff is the average distribution tariff in cents per
kWh for the corresponding zone (GRD). We expect the coefficient for this variable to be negative as
a higher price tends to depress demand. Finally, we employ two control variables at the municipal
level, the median income (income) and the population density (density).
We use three different estimation techniques. The robust least squares estimator for model
(2) is shown in the first column (pool) of Table 7. The fixed effects model amounts to specify a
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mean min max sd
oversized 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.48
pvsize 242 0 778 235
tariff 9,252 5,993 14,883 1,603
subsidy 55 0 105 36
income 22,334 15,671 34,399 2,744
density 411 24 1,997 475
Free_Elec 20 0 94 28
Observations 785200
Table 6: Sample Descriptive Statistics
different constant αi for each household; results are shown in the second column (FE). The ran-
dom effects model treats the heterogeneity across individuals as a random component; results are
shown in the third column (RE). In line with standard econometric recommendation, we favor this
latter model. The Breusch–Pagan test for random effects yields an extremely large value that far
exceeds the critical value for any reasonable significance level. We conclude that there is strong
evidence of individual heterogeneity. This finding leads us to run an additional series of regres-
sions, adding free_elec, our main variable of interest, to the set of explanatory variables. In the
following discussion, we refer to the random effects models presented in Columns (3) and (6).
We observe a negative time trend, meaning that consumption is declining over time. Energy
savings and more efficient energy appliances explain this declining trend which is also observed
at a more aggregated level. The coefficient for pvsize is positive and significant: households with
larger PV systems tend to consume more, corroborating the presence of an income effect. It should
be noticed that the coefficient for subsidy is positive but not significant which means that the
households who benefited from the most generous subsidy scheme do not consume more for a
given PV size. The coefficient for oversized is negative: households who oversize their PV installa-
tion consume less than those who don’t but this is because they belong to the smaller consumer
group. Interestingly, the positive coefficient for free_elec indicates a specific time trend for the pro-
sumers with an oversized installation: electricity consumption in oversized PV homes increases
with time. Households progressively increase their consumptions when they realize that they have
free electricity. Finally, the coefficient for tariff has the expected negative sign: consumption in-
creases with the mean income in the municipality while the negative density coefficient indicates
it decreases with population density.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pool FE RE Pool FE RE
month -2.708∗∗∗ 2.158∗ -1.910∗∗∗ -3.268∗∗∗ 0.479 -2.891∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.90) (0.15) (0.21) (1.06) (0.22)
oversized -289.9∗∗∗ 157.7∗∗∗ -229.8∗∗∗ -363.1∗∗∗ -2.446 -361.6∗∗∗
(8.88) (12.06) (9.02) (10.52) (13.42) (10.12)
pvsize 0.987∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
tariff 0.00918∗∗∗ -0.0181∗∗∗ -0.00444∗∗∗ 0.00886∗∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.00623∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
subsidy 0.0836 0 -0.0946 0.126∗ 0 -0.0307
(0.06) (.) (0.06) (0.06) (.) (0.06)
income 0.0170∗∗∗ -0.0631∗∗∗ 0.00150 0.0177∗∗∗ -0.0545∗∗ 0.00193
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
density 0.0430∗∗∗ -2.154∗∗∗ -0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0460∗∗∗ -1.840∗∗∗ -0.0210∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.39) (0.01) (0.01) (0.38) (0.01)
Free_Elec 1.450∗∗∗ 2.923∗∗∗ 2.543∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.32) (0.23)
Constant 2757.4∗∗∗ 480.2∗∗∗ 2498.1∗∗∗ 511.2∗∗∗
(349.99) (26.25) (372.75) (25.67)
Observations 785200 785200 785200 785200 785200 785200
R2 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7: Panel estimation results
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we test the existence of a rebound effect for solar PV installations in a specific insti-
tutional context, combining generous support to production and net metering. In Wallonia, the
Solwatt supporting scheme for small-scale residential PV production turned out to be so generous
that many rational households found it profitable to oversize their installation as the support of
the TGC already covered the module installation cost. This combined with net metering offered
these investors an opportunity for consuming “free” electricity, whenever their oversized installa-
tions generated in excess of their usual needs (over a year). Our empirical evidences demonstrates
that this phenomenon took place on a massive scale and that oversized PV households consumed
almost entirely their free energy surplus. There are thus strong evidence of a significant rebound
in consumption associated with the adoption of solar PV.
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We take this rebound to be a direct consequence of the wrongly designed supporting scheme
applied in Wallonia. Net metering has been criticized for providing inadequate price signals and
incentives by Brown and Sappington (2017) and Gautier et al. (2018). Next, excessively gener-
ous green certificates make the cost of solar energy socially expensive and transfer income from
non-prosumers to prosumers. Furthermore, the instrument may not be the most appropriate sup-
porting scheme as households discount the future too much (cf. De Groote and Verboven (2019)).
Despite these shortcomings, neither net metering nor tradable green certificates are in themselves
problematic. It is the combination of the two instruments that creates the conditions for a sub-
stantial increase in energy consumption by prosumers. Regulators and the government should
always remember that consumers react strongly to powerful financial incentives, in a manner that
is perfectly consistent with rational behavior.
Another policy implication of the net metering system is that households rarely auto-consume
their excessive production when the billing period is so long (cf. Gautier et al. (2018)). As the meter
is running backwards, excessive production can be stored on the grid for free until the next me-
ter reading, which might be as far ahead as one year. This means that the excessive production
of the sunny summer days can be stored on the grid and used during the dark cold winter days
to heat the house. Such a displacement of consumption from periods where electricity is pro-
duced at low cost and low carbon emissions to periods where it is produced at a higher cost using
carbon-intensive generators is certainly not environmentally friendly. Evidence collected from
a survey among prosumers in Wallonia by Gautier et al. (2019) suggests that heating is the pre-
ferred vector for increasing consumption. However, with mechanic meters recorded every year,
it is not possible to measure load displacement and we can only document an aggregate increase
in consumption. By contrast, the evidence provided by Qiu et al. (2019) based on daily meter
recording show that prosumers increase their consumption when their production increases i.e
they increase their auto-consumption (possibly because the star meter reduces the window of op-
portunity for deferred consumption).
Finally, when computing the carbon impact of solar PV, one should take this important re-
bound effect into account. Indeed, the additional consumption is partially substituting other en-
ergy vectors. Electric heating and heat pumps replace fuel or gas heating, electric mobility replaces
internal combustion engines, etc. However, this work cannot be done with the data currently col-
lected by the DSO as we have only information about the yearly consumption. We hope to be able




In this section, we model the choice of a representative household with respect to investment in
solar panels and the ensuing consumption level of electricity. The household is endowed with an
income w and consumes electricity and a composite good. Electricity can be bought on the market
at a retail price p or it can be locally produced with solar panels if the household has exercised the
option to invest in such an installation.
The solar PV installation is grid connected, which means that households who install solar pan-
els are making two types of exchange with the grid: imports from the grid when local production is
insufficient to cover consumption and exports to the grid when production exceeds consumption.
There are different metering technologies to measure the exchanges with the grid. Our model con-
siders the net metering technology currently used in Wallonia whereby household are equipped
with a single meter which runs backwards when electricity is exported. The meter then measures
net imports of energy (qˆ), that is the difference between total consumption (q) and total produc-
tion (k): qˆ = q −k. Net imports are used as the basis for the energy billing. However if production
exceeds consumption (qˆ < 0), there is no payment for the excessive energy supplied to the grid and
the bill is set to zero. Finally, there is a specific subsidy for green energy production i.e. a certain
number of TGC for each MWh produced. We define the variables of the model as follow:
• k˜: PV installation capacity in kWp
• ρ: PV module price ine/kWp
• β: the capacity factor of a typical PV installation
• k: production of the PV installation in kWh, with
k =βk˜ (3)
• η: subsidy for PV production ine/kWh
• q : consumption measured in kWh
• qˆ : registered (net) consumption in kWh, with
qˆ = q −k (4)
• p: retail price of electricity ine/kWh
• z: composite good (normalized unitary price)
• w : income
• r¯ : roof size capacity for PV installation in kWp
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• k¯: eligibility threshold for the subsidizing scheme in kWp
We denote the utility of a consumer as u(q, z). The utility function is differentiable, increasing




z+p max[0, qˆ]+ρk˜ ≤w +ηk, (6)
k˜ ≤min[r¯ , k¯] (7)
The first constraint is the budget constraint stating that the total revenue of the consumer available
for consumption sums income and subsidies for PV production; this revenue is used for financing
its net electricity consumption, the PV installation and expenditure on the composite good. The
second constraint limits the installation size which cannot exceed the roof size nor the eligibility
threshold.
Let us first consider the problem of a consumer who has not installed any solar panel (k˜ = 0).




z0 = w −q0p. (9)
We shall use this consumption levels as a benchmark for comparing with prosumers.
For k˜ > 0, the solution to the prosumer’s optimization problem depends on the profitability of
the PV panels. We partition the parameter space in three subsets.
Case 1 ρ ≤ βη: for those values, the subsidy offered for production more than covers the in-
vestment cost. The investment is highly profitable leading consumers to maximally invest so that
the second constraint becomes binding: k˜1 = min[r¯ , k¯]. The production of the PV installation is
then k1 =βk˜1.




where k∗ = βk˜∗ is the production of an installation of size k˜∗ and w∗ = w + k˜∗(βη−ρ)> w is the
available income for consumption. A consumer with an installation of size k˜∗ chooses (q∗, z∗) =
(k∗, w∗). We can now define the optimal consumption levels.
Proposition 1 When ρ ≤ βη, consumers choose the largest possible PV installation k˜1 = min[r¯ , k¯]
and,
• if k˜1 ≥ k˜∗ then q1 = k1 and z1 =w + k˜1(βη−ρ),
• if k˜1 ≤ k˜∗ then (q2, z2) defined as uq (q2,z2)uz (q2,z2) = p, z2 = z1−p(q2−k1),
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• q1 ≥ q∗ ≥ q2 ≥ q0 and z1 ≥ z∗ ≥ z2 ≥ z0.
Proposition 1 shows that when the installation size is larger than k˜∗, the prosumer consumes
all her production and uses her remaining income for the composite good. In such a case, the net
imports qˆ are equal to zero and the consumption levels (q1, z1) are determined by the constraints:
consumption of electricity is set to match the production and the consumption of the composite
good exhausts all the available income. If the installation is smaller than k˜∗, the prosumer still
finds it profitable to buy electricity from the grid at price p and the consumption levels are such
that the ratio of marginal utilities is equal to the ratio of marginal prices. In this case, the prosumer
has positive net imports: qˆ > 0 i.e. his production is insufficient to cover all his consumption.
In both cases, prosumers have a higher consumption than in the benchmark case. This con-
sumption increase results from an income effect when k˜1 ≤ k˜∗ and both an income and a zero
marginal price effect when k˜1 ≥ k˜∗; our objective is to disentangle these two effects. Note that
the consumption of electricity and of the composite good increases with income. The supporting
scheme provides a net income ∆w to the prosumers, arising from the PV subsidy. Suppose that
qˆ ≥ 0, this extra income is equal to:
∆w = k˜1(βη−ρ)+pk1. (11)
To measure the income effect, we derive the optimal consumption levels of a consumer that does




z+pq ≤w +∆w. (13)
The solution to this problem (q¯ , z¯) is defined as:
uq (q¯ , z¯)
uz(q¯ , z¯)
= p, (14)
z = w +∆w −pq¯ (15)
It is easy to check that for k˜1 ≤ k∗, the solutions (q¯ , z¯) and (q2, z2) are identical. We therefore mea-
sure the income effect by the differences in consumption (q¯ − q0) and (z¯ − z0). These differences
only result from a greater available income as prices remain identical.
With net metering, the price of electricity becomes discontinuous at q = k. Indeed, the price
is zero for q ≤ k (i.e. for qˆ ≤ 0) and p for q > k (i.e. for qˆ > 0). There is a zero marginal price effect
if there is some extra consumption that would not take place at a price of p but that would take
place at a zero price. At the solution (q¯ , z¯), the consumer has free electricity if q¯ ≤ k1, equivalently
if k1 ≥ k∗. Therefore in this case, under the assumption that uq > 0, the consumer will consume
all its production and the solution is at a corner: q = q1 = k1 and z = z1 = w + k˜1(βη−ρ). The
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difference q1− q¯ ≥ 0 measures the extra electricity consumption when electricity is available for
free i.e. the sought after zero price effect.
To summarize, when k˜1 ≤ k˜∗, all the variations in consumption are explained by the income
effect measured by q¯−q0. When k˜1 ≥ k∗, we have both an income effect q¯−q0 and a zero marginal
price effect q1− q¯ . Note finally that consumers who are exposed to a zero-marginal price effect
have a zero net import qˆ while those who are only exposed to the income effect have positive net
imports. We will use this distinction in our empirical estimations.
Case 2 βη ≤ ρ ≤ β(η+p): for those values, the subsidy is insufficient to cover the investment
cost but once the net metering is taken into account, the investment is profitable. This means that





z+pqˆ +ρk˜ ≤w +ηk, (17)
k˜ ≤min[ q
β
, r¯ , k¯] (18)
The optimal consumption levels are given by the equality between the ratios of marginal utilities
and prices and the installation size is given by the binding constraint (18). The solution corre-
sponding to case 2, (q3, z3), satisfies q3 > q0 and z3 > z0 since solar PV modules decreases the cost
of energy. There is no zero-marginal price in that case since the installation will never be oversized.
Case 3 β(η+p) ≤ ρ, then solar panels are not profitable and k˜ = 0 and the consumptions are
given by q0 and z0.
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